WPCy k挑cLF?vdz[)/ý^+ ֍)PVֺ i$^_I̒dv\W|JcQ\3r KswTD)LzXiXFR'K^ӛW"\9Y754˨azf>pkqcsrTW[ gr r|OcJ5ǞKUP F3teq"^i5gNs֚ W4Jnz7q?_ezWIQU |g_alwُ5[#*P"`YS1A6OO{Nu3T6s"pʣ;Y9Ae\:Z(lM5Vi=`$1Xva;ďHQ_JpڒVU>㌍W=*n0e/"r)K7#`"a#NUN %] 0(c 1 1u 0c 0w ^ a wm 4q   m 0 17 1 1E 1 ~S 0Dl 0BD=)|Gc&w{^nh4, >#N'G(*/^1u1sW44tJ5^566/7^.88 0NP::W&;}> 72?6?\?VQCND|D%GG3IJLcMz9N}N^0SlSS^U-V^XFY|ZZA\\]___ BDaaaT #  16      ׀Moreover,whereanewworkseeksto H commentonthehistoricalinaccuracyofafamousworklikeGoneWiththeWind,itisinevitable   thattheauthorwillalso provideamorebalancedviewofhistory,@  #  17      ׀andcourtsshouldnot  discountthetransformativecontentofthenewworkonthataccount.    Inthislight,theclaimofparodyintheWindDoneGonecaseisvirtuallyidenticaltothe  claimofparodyintheCampbellcase.Indeed,theCampbellcasealsoshowshowdifficultitisto ` distinguishparodyfromsatire.InCampbell,therapgroup2LiveCrewcombinedthebasic 8  melodyandcharacteristicguitarrifffromthelovesongOh,PrettyWomanwithlyricsthat  ` ridiculedtheromanticsentimentexpressedintheoriginalsong.Thedefendantsarguedthatthe  8  newsongwasaparodyoftheoriginalsongandwasthereforeprotectedasafairuse.The   difficultyinmakingajudicialdeterminationofwhetherauseconstitutesaparody,asatire,or   neitherisdemonstratedintheproceduralhistoryofthecase.Thedistrictcourtgrantedsummary p judgmentto2LiveCrew,holdingthattheusewasaparody.TheSixthCircuitreversed,stating H thatithaddifficultydiscerningtheelementofparodyinthedefendantssong,butevenassuming  p suchanelementexisted,thedefendantsborrowedmorethanwasnecessarytoachievethe H parody.TheSupremeCourtreversedandremanded,holdingthattheusewasatransformative   parody,butonlynarrowlyso:   8  Whilewemightnotassignahighranktotheparodicelementhere,wethinkitfair  tosaythat2LiveCrewssongreasonablycouldbeperceivedascommentingon l theoriginalorcriticizingit,tosomedegree.2LiveCrewjuxtaposestheromantic X  musingsofamanwhosefantasycomestrue,withdegradingtaunts,abawdy D! demandforsex,andasighofrelieffrompaternalresponsibility.Thelaterwords 0"  canbetakenasacommentonthenaiveteoftheoriginalofanearlierday,asa #l! rejectionofitssentimentthatignorestheuglinessofstreetlifeandthe $X" debasementthatitsignifies.Itisthisjoinderofreferenceandridiculethatmarks $D # offtheauthorschoiceofparody....B #  18      ׀%0!$   U=  Second,arulethatcategoricallyfavorsparodyoversatirethreatensFirstAmendment '#& valuesthatthefairusedoctrineissupposedtoprotect.Indeed,theCampbellCourtrejecteda  similarcategoricalrulewhenitdismissedtheplaintiffscontentionthattheearlierSonydecision  establishedapresumptionagainstfairnessforcommercialuses.Campbellbeganitsanalysisof ` thefairusedefensebyexplainingthat [t]hetaskisnottobesimplifiedwithbrightlinerules,for 8  thestatute,likethedoctrineitrecognizes,callsforcasebycaseanalysis., #  19      ׀TheCourtadded  ` thatSonyitself emphasizedtheneedforasensitivebalancingofinterestsand escheweda  8  rigid,brightlineapproachtofairuse.+| #  20      ׀Campbellsbrightlinedistinctionbetweenparodyand   satireseemsinconsistentwithitsstatedbalancingapproach,whicharguablywouldbebetter   servedbytreatingsatirelikeotherformsofprotectedcommentaryandbalancingitsvalueagainst p otherinterestsindeterminingfairuse. H   Moreover,evenifacategoricalrulewereappropriate,itseemsperversethatparodyofan  p individualcopyrightedworkshouldbefavoredoversatiricalcommentaryonbroadersocial H issuesofarguablygreatervaluetopublicdiscourse.W #  21      ׀IntheWindDoneGonecase,forinstance,   itisunclearwhyRandallsnovelshouldhavebeenentitledtogreaterprotectionifitisdeemedto  commentonlyonMitchellsnovelthanifitisdeemedtocommentonlyonaspectsofthe  antebellumSouth!includinginterracialrelationshipsandtheinjusticeofslavery!thatMitchells  novelignores.X #  22      ׀Likewise,intheDr.Seusscase,evenassumingthatthedefendantsallegedly  infringingbookofrhymescommentedonlyontheO.J.SimpsonmurdercaseandnotontheDr. ` Seussbooksthemselves(asthecourtfound),itwouldseemthatcommentaryonthemost 8  controversialmurdercaseindecadesshouldweighheavierinCampbells sensitivebalancingof  ` intereststhancriticismofabookofchildrensrhymes.  8    Giventheformidableproblemswiththedistinctionbetweenparodyandsatire,whydid   theCourtmakeit?Thedistinctionmightbeexplained,atleasttoalargeextent,underadilution   theory.Parodyisfavoredbecauseitenhancesthedistinctivenessofaworkbysinglingitoutfor p individualcomment.Satire,ontheotherhand,isdisfavoredbecauseitdecreasestheworks H distinctivenessbyusingitasavehicleforpokingfunatagenreofworksoratsomepartof  p society.F| #  23      ׀ H   2. @ Commercialuses   O  Thesecondinquiryinassessingthepurposeandcharacterofauseinthefairuseanalysis  iswhethertheuseiscommercialinnature.Theconventionalwisdomisthatcommercialuses  arelessfairthannoncommercialuses.Thecaselawisunclear,however,onthesignificanceof X  commercialityintheanalysis.IntheSonyBetamaxcase,theSupremeCourtsuggestedthat  commercialusesarepresumptivelyunfair.TheCampbellCourtsubsequentlyretreatedfromthat  position,however,statingthatalthoughcommercialityweighsagainstafindingoffairuse,it ` doesnotcreateapresumption.K #  24      ׀ 8    Moreover,itisdifficulttodiscernwhetherthecommercialityfactorpossesses  ` independentsignificanceintheanalysis.Itispossiblethatthecommercialnatureofaparticular  8  usemightbearonacopyrightownersincentivesbecauseitcouldaffectthecopyrightowners   profits.Itisunnecessarytoconsidersuchharmunderthefirstfairusefactor,however,because   thefourthfactordirectlyconsiders harmtothemarketforthecopyrightedwork.L #  25      ׀ p Commercialityalsomightsuggestthattheuseisnottransformative,buttransformativenessisa H separateinquiryunderthefirstfactor,and,inanyevent,thereisonlyaweaklinkbetweenthe  p two.AstheCampbellCourtexplainedinrejectingSonyspresumption,mostoftheexamplesof H transformativeuses listedinthepreambleparagraphof107,includingnewsreporting,   comment,criticism,teaching,scholarship,andresearch,...aregenerallyconductedforprofitin  thiscountry.MZ  #  26      ׀Thus,wherethedefendanthasusedaworkforapurposeprivilegedfor  enumerationinthe107fairuseprovision,suchasnewsreportingorresearch,thefactthatthe X  defendantsusewascommercial,orforprofit,typicallydoesnotdefeatafairusedefense,unless  thereisstrongevidenceoflostprofitsunderthefourthfactor.N #  27      ׀Asaresult,itseemsthatthe  commercialityfactorissuperfluousinmanycases. `   Thecommercialityfactordoesretainimportanceinatleastonecategoryofcases.Courts 8  frequentlyfindthatusesresultingincommerciallyviableproductsarenottransformative,even  ` wheresuchproductsaddasignificantamountofnewexpression.O| #  28      ׀Thistrendisparticularly  8  troublingbecausethese commercialproductsincludecreativeworkssuchasnovelsandsongs   thatordinarilylieatthecoreofcopyrightprotection.Indeed,suchworksoftenconveyamore   powerfulmessagethannonfictionalhistoriesandbiographiesthatreceivefavoredtreatmentas p researchorcommentary.Q #  29      ׀Whilesuchnonfictionalworksprovideimportantinformationabout H whathasoccurred,literaryartfocusesonwhatcouldhappenormighthavehappened,causing  p readerstothinkmorebroadlyoutsideaparticularcontext.R #  30      ׀ H   Nevertheless,courtsincopyrightinfringementcasesfrequentlyfailtoappreciatethe   valueofusesthatresultinnewcommercialproducts.Forinstance,intheWindDoneGonecase,   thedistrictcourtgrantedtheplaintiffsmotionforapreliminaryinjunctionagainstdistributionof  defendantsbook,rejectingthedefendantsclaimthatthebookwasatransformativefairuse.J #  31      ׀   Thecourt conclude[d]thatwhileTheWindDoneGoneinpartcriticizesGoneWiththeWind,  thebooksoverallpurposeistocreateasequeltotheolderworkandprovideMs.Randalls ` socialcommentaryontheantebellumSouth.Z #  32      ׀Thus,theWindDoneGonecourtfailedto 8  recognizethatthepurposeofRandallsbookisnotprimarilytoexposetherealityofthe  ` antebellumSouth,buttoexposehowGoneWiththeWinddivergedfromthatreality.Ratherthan  8  writingadirecthistoricalcritiqueoftheoriginalbook,however,Randallchosetowriteanother   bookthatjuxtaposesGoneWiththeWindsglamorousstorycomprisinggallantmen,charming   women,andofScarlettandRhettduringtheCivilWarperiodwithasecondstorycomprisinga p blackgirlsimpressionsofandstruggleswithprejudice,slavery,andmiscegenationduringthe H sameperiod.ThedissonanceproducedbythisjuxtapositionexposesthemythofGoneWiththe  p Wind .[ #  33      ׀  H   Inthisway,thebookisessentiallythefictionalequivalentofotherformsofcommentary   traditionallydeemedtobefairuse,suchasbookandfilmreviews.Indeed,bookandfilm  reviewsoftencritiquenotonlytheartisticqualityofthework,butalsotheaccuracyofthework,  evenwhentheworkisknowntobefictional.Forinstance,followingthereleaseofthemovie X  PearlHarborin2001,severalnewspaperarticlescriticizedthemovieforcontainingnumerous  historicalinaccuracies.Onearticlecriticizedvirtuallytheentiremovie,interviewingWorldWar  IIhistorianswhopointedout,amongotherthings,that:thecommunicationstechnologyusedin ` theplanesinthemoviedidnotexistinthe1940's;theJapaneseattackonPearlHarborwasnot 8  actuallyassurprisingtotheUnitedStatesadministrationasthemoviesuggests;andPresident  ` Rooseveltneverwouldhaveusedhismedicalconditiontomotivatepeoplethewayhischaracter  8  (playedbyJonVoight)didinthemovie.\ #  34      ׀Similarly,numerousnewspaperarticlesdebatedthe   historicalaccuracyofthefilmTitanicfollowingitsreleasein1998.]  #  35      ׀     Inaddition,theSecondCircuithasheldthatasongentitledCunnilingusChampionof  CompanyC,whichcombinednew,sexuallyhumorouslyricswiththetuneofthefamoussong  BoogieWoogieBugleBoyofCompanyB,didnotconstitutefairuse,onthegroundthatitwasa ` competingproductthatdidnottransformtheoriginal.Thecourtrejectedthedefendants 8  testimonyindicatingthatthepurposeofthenewsongwasto combin[e]theinnocentmusicof  ` the40'swithwordsoftenconsideredtobetabootomakeaveryfunnypoint,althoughitis  8  difficulttoimaginewhatotherpurposethedefendantwouldhavehadinproducingthework.   Thecourtthereforerejectedtheargumentthatthenewsongwaseitheraparodyorsatire.     Moreover,thecourtindicatedthatthedefendantsusewasunfairbecauseitresultedina p newcommercialproductofthesamegeneraltypeasthecopyrightedwork(asong).Thus,the H courtnotedthat plaintiffsanddefendantswerecompetitorsintheentertainmentfield,andthat  p bothsongswere performedonthestage, soldasrecordings,and soldinprintedcopies.`T #  36      ׀It H isimportanttonotethatthecourtdidnotindicatehowanyofthesegeneralcommonalities   betweenthetwoverydifferentsongsshowedthatthedefendantssongsupplantedthemarketfor  theplaintiffssong.Thecourtsimplyrefusedtoallowthedefendanttocreateacommercial  productthattarnishedtheimageoftheoriginalsong,eventhoughthenewproductobviously X  transformedtheoriginal. #  37      ׀ 0"    Numerousothercasesalsohavedeniedthetransformativenessofusesoffamousworks  thathaveresultedinnewproducts.Forinstance,thecourtintheSeinfeldcaseoverlookedagreat  dealofnewcontentandarrangementinaSeinfeldtriviabook,characterizing anytransformative ` purpose[as]slighttononexistent.! #  38      ׀Similarly,theNinthCircuiterredinconcludingthatan 8  entirelynewbookofrhymesabouttheO.J.SimpsonmurdertrialdidnottransformtheDr.Seuss  ` bookofrhymesfromwhichitborrowed,saying thereisnoefforttocreateatransformative  8  workwithnewexpression,meaning,ormessage.% #  39      ׀Courtshavereachedsimilarlyerroneous   conclusionsabouttransformativenessinothercasesinvolvingfamousworksaswell.( #  40      ׀     Thus,themaincategoryofcasesinwhichitseemsthatthecommercialfactorplaysa  majorroleisthecategoryinvolvingthecreationofnewcommercialproducts.Inthesecases,the  commercialnaturetrumpsthetransformativenessoftheuse,evenwherethereisnoevidencethat ` thenewproductsupplantedsalesoftheplaintiffsproductorotherwiseaffectedtheincentivesto 8  producetheoriginalwork.U #  41      ׀Bycontrast,thecommercialnatureofauseseemsirrelevantin  ` othercontexts.Forusesthatresultinmarketharmorlostprofitsunderthefourthfactor,the  8  commercialprongissuperfluous.Forusessuchasnewsreportingorresearch,the   transformativenessoftheusetrumpsthecommercialnatureoftheuse,andthecommercialfactor   islargelyignored.Whydoesthecommercialfactorloomsolargefortheformerusesbutnotfor p thelatter? H   Theansweristhatthecommercialfactorisimportantinthesecasesbecausethecourts  p areapplyingadilutiontheoryofcopyrightinfringement.Wherethereisevidencethatthe H defendantsusewillsupplantsalesoftheplaintiffswork,thereisharmtothemarketforthe   copyrightedworkunderthefourthfairusefactor.Insuchcases,therewilllikelybeliability  underatraditionaltheoryofcopyrightinfringement,becausethereislikelyaneffectonthe  incentivetocreatetheoriginalwork.Wherethereisnoproofofmarketharm,however,itisless X  clearwhethertherewouldbeinfringementunderthetraditionalincentivetheory.Thedilution 0"  theorythenpicksupwheretheincentivetheoryleavesoff,justasthedilutiontheoryin $X" trademarklawpicksupwheretheconsumerconfusiontheoryleavesoff.Becausethedilution %0!$ theoryisconcernedwithmaintainingthedistinctivenessofawork,itexplainswhysome '#& commercialusesareprotectedastransformativefairuseswhileothersarenot.The  transformativeusesenumeratedin107,includingnewsreporting,research,commentary,etc.,  arefairuses(absentclearevidenceofmarketharm)becausetheytypicallyenhancethe ` distinctivenessofaworkbytreatingtheworkobjectivelyasaworkandasanewsorresearch 8  worthysubject.Bycontrast,usingacopyrightedworkinthecreationofanewcommercial  ` productisoftennotdeemedtobeatransformativefairuse,becauseittendstoblurortarnishthe  8  distinctivenessoftheworkbyincorporatingitinnewproductstobesoldincommerce.Inthis   light,thecommercialnatureofauseisrelevantprimarilywhereitdilutesthedistinctivenessof   thecopyrightedwork,whetherornottheusewouldaffecttheincentivetocreatethecopyrighted p work. H   Indeed,inmanycasesinvolvingnewproductsthatborrowfromfamouscopyrighted  p works,courtsfrequentlyemphasizefactorsthatareirrelevanttocopyrightanalysisbutthatwould H beveryrelevantinatrademarkdilutionanalysis.IntheBoogieWoogieBugleBoycase,for   instance,theSecondCircuitessentiallyappliedatarnishmenttheoryofdilution.Thecourtfound  offensivethejuxtapositionofwhatthedefendantsreferredtoas thehumorouspracticeof  cunnilinguswithasongthatthecourtsaid achieveditsgreatestpopularityduringthetragicand X  unhappyyearsofWorldWarII,inwhich292,131Americanslosttheirlives.: #  42      ׀Thecourt 0"  summarizeditsfairuseanalysisbysaying, Wearenotpreparedtoholdthatacommercial $X" composercanplagiarizeacompetitorscopyrightedsong,substitutedirtylyricsofhisown, %0!$  performitforcommercialgain,andthenescapeliabilitybycallingtheendresultaparodyor '#& SOY S S  satireonthemoresofsociety.- #  43      ׀     Othercasesemphasizefactssimilartothosethatarerelevantindeterminingwhethera  trademarkis famousunderthedilutionprovisionoftheLanhamAct.Forinstance,intheStar ` Trekcase,thecourtnotedthatsincethedebutoftheoriginalStarTrektelevisionseriesin1966, 8  charactersincludingCaptainKirkandMr.Spock havebecomehouseholdnames,andthat  `  [t]hepopularityoftheStarTrekPropertieshasgivenrisetoacottageindustryofproducts...  8  rang[ing]fromtoysandclothingtobookswhichdetaileveryconceivableaspectoftheStarTrek   Properties.| #  44      ׀Moreover,thecourtobservedthatbetween1994andcommencementofthesuitin   1998,copyrightownerParamountPictures spentconsiderabletimeandmoneyenforcingits p intellectualpropertyrightsbybringing overonehundredactionsrelatedtotheStarTrek H Propertiesandspen[ding]onemilliondollarsperyeartoenforcetheseintellectualproperty  p rights. #  45      ׀ H   Althoughafewofthesefactsmightberelevanttodeterminingharmtopotentialmarkets   undercopyrightsfairuseanalysis,thecourtsdescriptionoftheStarTrekPropertiesismuch  morereminiscentoftrademarkdilutionanalysis,inwhichacourtmustdeterminewhetherthe  markis famousbyevaluatingthemarksdegreeofdistinctiveness,durationofandextentof X  use,durationandextentofadvertisingandpublicity,degreeofrecognition,andchannelsoftrade 0"  forthegoodsorservicesrepresentedbythemark .    $X"   B.SecondFactor:NatureoftheCopyrightedWork    Thedilutiontheoryofcopyrightalsohelpstoexplainhowthesecondfairusefactorhas  beenapplied.Indeed,the natureofthecopyrightedworkisthefactorthatfocusesmost ` directlyonmaintainingthedistinctivenessofthecopyrightedwork.Thus,thegeneraltrendin 8  judicialanalysisofthisfactorhasbeenthatcreativeworksreceivemoreprotectionthanfactual  ` works,andunpublishedworksreceivealmostcompleteprotectionfromcopying." #  46      ׀Theincentive  8  theoryprovidesonlyapartialexplanationforthisrule.Underanincentivetheory,itmakessense   tohavemoreprotectionforunpublishedworks,atleastwhereitislikelythattheworkwillenter   markets,suchasthemarketforprepublicationexcerpts,thatarenotinatissueforworksthat p havealreadybeenpublished.| #  47      ׀Inaddition,providingmaximumprotectiontounpublishedworks H encouragesauthorstoinvesttheirresourcesincreatingaworkbecausetheyknowtheywillhave  p theopportunitytofinishandperfecttheworkbeforeitisdistributed.Thereproductionand H distributionofunpublishedworksalsoimplicateFirstAmendmentprivacyandspeechrightsthat   militateagainstafindingoffairuse.    Asaresult,itmakessenseunderanincentivetheorythatthefairusedefenseshould  affordlessprotectionforusesofunpublishedworks.Butthistheorydoesnotexplainwhythe X   unpublishednatureofaworkissucha criticalelement. #  48      ׀thatitwillordinarilyoverrideallother 0"  factorsinthefairuseanalysis.< #  49      ׀Wheretheworkisneverintendedtobepublished,asinthecase   ofJ.D.Salingersletters,Gh #  50      ׀theincentivetheorydoesnotworkwellatall.Andalthoughthefair  useanalysisshouldtakeintoaccountanauthorsspeechandprivacyrights,aswellastherightto ` controlaworkuntilitisreadytodistribute,therearecountervailingconsiderationsthatweigh 8  againstenforcingapresumptionagainstthefairusedefenseforunpublishedworks.Forinstance,  ` mostoftheleadingcasesonunpublishedworksinvolvefamousauthorswhoseworkswereused  8  byhistoriansorbiographers.Theruleonunpublishedworkshasasignificantimpactonsuch   transformativescholarship./ #  51      ׀     Thedilutiontheoryhelpstoexplainwhythefairusedoctrineapproachesunpublished p worksinacategoricalmannerandpublishedworksonacasebycasebasis.Inmanyways,an H unpublishedworkisthemostdistinctivetypeofwork.Itisuniqueandpristine,havingnever  p beencopiedoradaptedintootherformsandmedia.Assuch,itisthekindofworkthatwill H sufferthegreatestlossofdistinctivenessthroughblurringandtarnishment.     C.ThirdFactor:AmountandSubstantialityoftheUse  ,  Thethirdfactorthatmustbeconsideredindeterminingwhetherauseisfairundersection  107istheamountandsubstantialityofthecopyrightedworkthathasbeentaken.Thisfactor X  takesintoaccountboththequantityandqualityoftheportionofthecopyrightedworktakenby 0"  theallegedinfringer.Thus,theSupremeCourthasheldthattheuseofevenarelativelysmall $X" portionofacopyrightedworkmightconstituteasubstantialuseunderthisfactorifthatportion %0!$ constitutesthe heartofthework.InHarper&RowPub.v.TheNation,theSupremeCourt  heldthatalthoughTheNationmagazinehadcopiedverbatimonly300wordsfroma22,000  wordmanuscriptofPresidentGeraldFordsmemoirs,thatportionwasneverthelesssubstantial ` forpurposesofthefairuseanalysisbecauseitconstitutedthe heartofthebook!thepart 8  discussingPresidentFordspardonofRichardNixon.* #  52      ׀Becausethedefendanthadengagedin  ` verbatimcopying,andtherewasactualevidenceofmarketharm,theCourtwasjustifiably  8  concernedthatthedefendantsuseoftheexcerptwouldsupplantorsupersedethemarketforthe   originalorthemarketforderivativeworks.3 #  53      ׀     TheCourthassinceexplicitlyreiterateditsviewthattheamountandsubstantialityfactor p shouldbeevaluatedintandemwiththeotherfairusefactors.InCampbell,forexample,the H CourtheldthatevenifthedefendantsrapversionoftheplaintiffssongOh,PrettyWoman  p appropriatedtheheartoftheoriginalbytakingthecharacteristicbassguitarriffandsomeofthe H mostrecognizablelyrics,thedefendantsusewasstillpotentiallyfairuse.7t #  54      ׀Thus,theCourt   explainedthataparodistispermittedtouseatleasttheamountofthecopyrightedwork  necessaryto conjureuptheoriginal,andthat [o]nceenoughhasbeentakentoassure  identification,howmuchmoreisreasonablewilldepend,say,ontheextenttowhichthesongs X  overridingpurposeandcharacteristoparodytheoriginal,or,incontrast,thelikelihoodthatthe  parodymayserveasamarketsubstitutefortheoriginal.6 #  55      ׀    Consideringboththequantityandqualityoftheamounttakeninlightofthepurposeof ` theuse,marketharm,andotherfactors,isgenerallyconsistentwiththeincentivetheoryof 8  copyright.Thereare,however,anumberofwaysinwhichjudicialapplicationofthethirdfair  ` usefactortendstodiminishpotentiallylegitimatefairuseclaims,particularlyincasesinvolving  8  famousworks.Whenacopyrightedworkissofamousthatithasbecomeahouseholdnameor   image,virtuallyanyuseoftheworkmayseemlikeanappropriationofthe heartofthework.   IntheStarTrekcase,forinstance,thecourtemphasizedthatthedefendantsworkTheJoyof p Trekhadtakenthe heartoftheStarTrekPropertiesbydiscussingStarTreks fictitiousfacts H andbyusing anumberofquotes,suchaslivelongandprosperandmakeitsothatareused  p intheStarTrekProperties.#| #  56      ׀Althoughsuchquotesareaverysmallpartofboththeoriginal H copyrightedworkandtheallegedlyinfringingwork,thefameofthesequotesandoftheStar   Trekworksthemselvescausedthecourttotreattheuseofthesequotesascontributingtoa  substantialinfringementofthework.    Similarly,intheDr.Seusscase,theNinthCircuitheldthatbydepictingO.J.Simpsonin X  aredandwhitestripedstovepipehatliketheoneordinarilywornbytheplaintiffsCatinthe 0"  Hatcharacter,thedefendantshadappropriatedtheplaintiffs highlyexpressivecoreand $X" thereforehadtakenasubstantialportionofthecopyrightedworkunderthethirdfactor. %0!$ AlthoughitistruethattheimageoftheCatintheHatisperhapsthemostfamouselementofthe  Dr.Seussworks,thedefendantsdidnotdepictplaintiffsCatintheHat.Instead,itmerely  depictedO.J.Simpsonwearingasimilarhat.Moreover,theappropriationofthiselementwas ` insignificantinlightoftheotherfairusefactors.ThepurposeoftheO.J.Simpsonbookwasto 8  makeaparodicorsatiricaluseoftheoriginal.Itcomprisedverydifferentsubjectmatterand  ` borrowedverylittleliteralexpressionfromtheplaintiffsbooks.Assuch,itishighlyunlikely  8  thattheO.J.Simpsonbookcausedanyharmtothemarketfortheoriginalwork.    (503  Furthermore,courtshaveexplicitlystatedthatinparodycasestheamountwhichmaybe   borrowedfromfamousworksislessthantheamountwhichmaybetakenfromlesserknown p works,onthegroundthatwhereaworkhas widespreadpublicrecognition,lesscopyingis H necessarytoconjureuptheoriginal.' #  57      ׀Widespreadrecognitionofafamousworkshouldcutin  p theoppositedirection,however,becauseifaworkisverywellknown,minordeviationsfromthe H originalwillcauseconfusionastothepurposeoftheborrowing.Indeed,giventhatparodyis   heavilyfavoredoversatireandothertransformativeproducts,itisoftenimportantfora  defendanttoemphasizetheelementsborrowedfromtheoriginalratherthanthenewelements.  Forinstance,anyparodyofGoneWiththeWindshouldprobablyincludeafemalecharacterwho X  isverymuchlikeScarletOHara;otherwise,theaudiencewillassumetheworkisasatireofthe 0"  southratherthanaparodyofGoneWiththeWind.   $X"   Moreover,whethertheallegedinfringersuseofcopyrightedmaterialissubstantialeither  inquantityorinqualitywilldependonhowtheborrowedportionsareaggregated.Somecourts  addallofthematerialthathasbeenborrowedfromseparatecopyrightedworkstogetherfor ` purposesofdecidingwhetherenoughwastakentoconstitutesubstantialcopying.Forinstance, 8  thecourtsintheSeinfeldandTwinPeakscasesaddedtheamountborrowedfromallepisodes  ` togetherinconsideringwhetherthecopyingwassubstantialforpurposesoffairuse,although  8  televisionepisodesareusuallyconsideredseparatelyformostotherpurposes,including   copyrightabilityandassessmentofdamages.IntheSeinfeldcase,thedefendantborrowedonly   about35%ofeachepisode,butthecourtputitalltogether,foundthattheamountofcopying p wassubstantial,anddeniedafairusedefenseforthedefendantstransformativework. H   D.FourthFactor:HarmtotheMarketfortheCopyrightedWork  p   Courtsfrequentlyrefertothefourthfactorinthefairuseanalysisasthemostimportant H factor,oratleastthefirstamongequals.Thisfactorconsidersharmtothemarketfortheoriginal   copyrightedwork,and,becausetheCopyrightActalsogivescopyrightownersbroadderivative  worksrights,itconsidersharmtomarketsforderivativeworksaswell.Givingsignificant  weighttothisfactorisconsistentwiththeincentivetheoryofcopyrightbecauseitfocusesonthe X  extenttowhichadefendantsusedeprivesacopyrightownerofexpectedprofitsfromherwork. 0"    Thus,wherethereisstrongevidencethedefendantsusehassupplantedthemarketfor $X" theoriginal,itisunlikelycourtswillfindfairuse.Forinstance,inHarper&Row,thedefendant %0!$ obtainedPresidentFordsmanuscriptofATimetoHeal,whichwasabouttobepublished,and '#& publishedimportantexcerptsdealingwiththepardonofPresidentNixoninitsnewsmagazine.? #  58      ׀ )$( Therewasevidencethat,asaresultofthedefendants scoopingthebook,TimeMagazine  cancelledacontractforprepublicationexcerptsofthebook.H #  59      ׀TheSupremeCourtrejectedthe  defendantsfairuseclaim,overavigorousdissentemphasizingthatthedefendantsusewasfor ` thepurposeofnewsreporting,whichisasociallybeneficialusedeservingoffairuse 8  protection.I| #  60      ׀  `   Inmanycases,however,thereisnoevidencethatthedefendantsusereducedsalesofthe  8  originalwork.Yet,courtsfrequentlyrejectfairuseclaimsinsuchcases.Therearetwomain   doctrinalreasonsforthesedecisions.Theoverlybroadderivativeworksrightleadscourtsto   considerwhetherthedefendantsusecouldsupplantanymarketintowhichthecopyrightowner p couldconceivablyadaptthework.Inaddition,theconceptofmarketharmhasbeenexpandedto H includenotonlylostsalesoftheoriginalworkoraderivativework,butalsolostlicensingfees  p thatthedefendantcouldhavepaidforanyuseofthework.Thus,courtshaveagreatdealof H latitudeindevelopingexpansivenotionsofharm.Thisisparticularlytrueincasesinvolving   famousworks,forwhichderivativeworksandlicensingarrangementsarecommon.    Thus,manycourtsfindharmtothemarketforafamouscopyrightedworkundera  dilutiontheorywheretheywouldbehardpressedtofinditunderanincentivetheory.The X  incentivetheoryhasledtheSupremeCourttospecifythatcourtsshouldconsideronlythe harm 0"  ofmarketsubstitutionandnototherharmssuchastheeffectofcriticalcommentaryonthe $X" marketabilityofawork.; #  61      ׀Yet,courtsfrequentlyfindmarketharmwherethedefendantsuseof  plaintiffsworkcouldaffecttheworksdistinctiveimageofthework.    Forinstance,intheDr.Seusscase,thecourtpurportedtofindharmtothemarketbased ` onmarketsubstitution,buttheharmitdescribesismorerelatedtoalossofdistinctivenessofDr. 8  Seussbooks.TheNinthCircuitappliedtheSecondCircuitstestforthemarketharmfactor,  ` whichitdescribedthisway:8   8  8  TheSecondCircuithascharacterizedthisfactorascallingforthestrikingofa   balance betweenthebenefitthepublicwillderiveiftheuseispermittedandthe   personalgainthecopyrightownerwillreceiveiftheuseisdenied.Theless   adverseeffectthatanallegedinfringingusehasonthecopyrightowners   expectationofgain,thelesspublicbenefitneedbeshowntojustifytheuse.A #  62      p     TheNinthCircuitexplainedthatbecause [t]hegoodwillandreputationassociatedwith H Dr.Seussworkissubstantial,thesatiricaluseoftheworkismorelikelytoresultinmarket  p substitution,andtherefore marketharmmaybemorereadilyinferred.E  #  63      ׀Itisnotclearwhythe H courtthoughtthatthereputationofDr.Seussworkswasmorelikelytoresultinmarket   substitution.ThecourtseemedtobelievethatbecauseDr.Seussworkissofamous,itismore  likelythatDr.Seussworkswillexpandintoothermarkets,andthereforeitismorelikelythatDr.  Seusswillsuffermarketharm.Thisviewisseriouslyflawed.First,thedefendantsbookof X  rhymeschroniclingthemurdertrialofO.J.SimpsonwouldnevercompetewiththeDr.Seuss  childrensbooks.Second,despitethefameofDr.Seussworks!orperhapsbecauseofit!itis  veryunlikelythatDr.Seusswouldeverproduceorlicenseworksofanaturesimilartotheworks ` producedbythedefendants.Third,evenassumingthattheusehadsomeadverseeffectonthe 8   copyrightownersexpectationofgain,underthebalancingtestappliedbythecourt,thateffect  ` isinsubstantialcomparedtothepublicbenefitassociatedwithallowingtheuse.Thereissimply  8  nowaythatallowingthistypeofusecausesthesortofmarketsubstitutionthatwouldreducethe   copyrightownersincentivetocreatethecopyrightedworksinthefirstplace.Moreover,evenif   thedefendantsworkconstitutedsatireratherthanparody(whichisverydebatable),thereis p clearlypublicbenefitinallowingsatirethatcriticizesamurdererandthesystemofjustice(or H injustice)thatletshimgofree.  p   Thus,thecourtisunpersuasiveinitsstatementthatmarketharmcouldbeinferredbased H onatheoryofmarketsubstitution.Rather,thedecisionisbestunderstoodasacaseinwhichthe   courtassumedharmbasedimplicitlyonatheoryofcopyrightdilution.Thegoodwilland  reputationemphasizedbythecourtflowfromthecreativeanddistinctivequalityofDr.Seuss  work,andanyusethatincorporatesorreplicatesthatdistinctivequalityinanewproductrenders X  theoriginallessdistinctive.Itisthislossofdistinctiveness!notpotentialmarketsubstitution! 0"  thatthecourtunwittinglycharacterizesas marketharmunderthefourthfactorofitsfairuse $X" analysis. %0!$   AdistrictcourtsimilarlyadoptedadilutiontheoryofharminacaseinvolvingTys '#& BeanieBabies.D #  64      ׀ThedefendantWestPublishingcreatedabookthatprovidedinformationabout )$( allofthecollectiblestuffedanimals,includinghistoricalessays,evaluationsastoprice,and  recommendationsonwhethertobuy.Becausethebookalsocontainedphotographsofthe  BeanieBabies,however,thecourtfoundthatthebookinfringedTyscopyright. `   IngrantingTysmotionforapreliminaryinjunctionagainstthemanufacturingandselling 8  oftheWestsbooks,thecourtrejectedtheWestsargumentthatthebookwasatransformative  ` workdeservingofprotectionunderthefairusedoctrine.AlthoughTywouldnotbeinaposition  8  tocreateabookprovidingimpartialmarketassessmentsofthecollectibles,andsuchabookis   muchmoreusefulwiththephotographsthanwithoutthem,thecourtfoundthebookharmed   Tysmarketforderivativeworks. p   Itisclear,however,thatthecourtwasmoreconcernedwithdilutingthedistinctiveimage H oftheBeanieBabiesthanwithprotectingagainstharmtomarketsthatTymightreasonably  p exploit.Thecourtnotedthatthe popularityoftheBeanieBabiesisduelargelytoTys own H shrewdbusinesspracticeofcreatingashortageinordertoexcitethemarket,andthat [b]y   recurringshortages,TyseekstomaintaintheenormousdemandandpopularityofBeanieBabies  foraslongaspossible,andconsequentlyseekstoavoidoverexposureormarketsaturation.  Thus,thecourtfoundthatthese derivativeworkscouldhaveanegativelongtermeffectonthe X  marketforTysworksbydestroyingthemarketingimageTyhascarefullycreatedforits 0"  products....8 #  65      ׀Thetypeofharmthatoccurswhenadefendantswork destroy[s]themarketing $X" imageofaplaintiffsworkisobviouslyverydifferentfromthetypethatoccurswhena %0!$ defendantsworkactuallysupplantssalesoftheplaintiffswork.Indeed,theconcernwith '#&  avoidingoverexposureinordertomaintainaworksdistinctive imageistheheartofa )$( dilutionclaim.    [Othercases.]     IV.Analysisofwhetherdilutionisappropriateincopyrightlaw  ` {@*